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Clear Understanding and Long-term Thinking:
MFN Status in 1996
Remarks of Senator Max Baucus
Business Coalition for US-China Trade
May 8, 1996
Good morning, everyone. Thank you, Cal, for that kind introduction. Thank you,
everyone, for coming, and for the hard work you have done on China's Most Favored Nation
status over the years. You can be proud of what we have achieved so far.
But as we prepare for a sixth year of the MFN debate, some of us remember that
famous Yogi Berra saying -- "It's deja vu all over again." We've heard the arguments on
both sides more than once, and our goals over the next decade are a more interesting topic
than our goals for the next two months. But we must begin a discussion of China policy with
MFN status, because we can't do much at all unless we avoid disaster in the short term.
THE BASIC FACTS
The Sung Dynasty philosopher Chu Hsi, arguing for high academic standards in
awarding government offices, said actions are ultimately more important than understanding --
but without clear understanding actions are pointless or even harmful. Following that
common-sense approach, we should understand what MFN is before we start acting or voting
on it.
MFN is not a special favor and it does not mean "best country." It traditionally meant
that we would give a country the same tariff rates everyone else got. And today, in fact,
MFN is closer to "Least" than "Most" favored nation.
Only seven countries -- Afghanistan, Cuba, Cambodia, Laos, North Korea, Vietnam
and Yugoslavia -- lack MFN status. And later this morning, the Finance Committee will vote
on a bill to get Cambodia off that list. By contrast, 31 countries get tariffs below MFN
through the Caribbean Basin Initiative, the Andean Trade Preference Act, the NAFTA and the
US-Israel Free Trade Agreement. If all goes well at the Committee, another bill will renew
the Generalized System of Preferences, and bring the total to 151 countries and territories
with tariffs below MFN.
CONSEQUENCES OF REVOKING MFN STATUS
So giving China MFN status is nothing special. And now look at revoking MFN. It
raises tariffs from Uruguay Round to Smoot-Hawley levels. That would bring our average
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tariff on Chinese goods from 4.6% to 40%. To choose some of China's largest exports,
Smoot-Hawley tariffs raise the duty on silk blouses ten-fold, from 6.5% to 65%. On radio-
tape players, from 1% to 35%. On toys and stuffed animals, from zero to 70%.
This would make trade with China impossible. The World Bank has predicted that
revoking MFN would cut China's exports to the US by 96%. That means $44 billion worth
of goods, nearly a third of China's total exports to the world. China's inevitable retaliation
would cost us $14 billion in direct exports, plus a large part of our $17 billion in exports to
Hong Kong.
The consequences would be staggering. China would suffer a humanitarian crisis, as
millions of workers in coastal export factories lost their jobs overnight. The damage to Hong
Kong would be tremendous. The United States would lose hundreds of thousands of export
jobs. Retailers and the millions of people they employ would suffer a massive disruption of
toy and apparel imports just as they are buying stocks for the Christmas season.
And although MFN is a trade policy, the malign effect of revoking it would go far
beyond trade and jobs. It is hard to see how we could continue working with China in areas
of mutual interest. And the consequences in politics and security -- from our ability to
manage the nuclear aspirations of North Korea, to preventing weapons proliferation in the
Middle East, to the UN Security Council and beyond -- would be immense.
Revoking MFN, then, would be a destructive act. We should not do it. We should
not try a split-the-baby halfway approach, like revoking MFN for state-owned industry or
bringing China back to Tokyo Round tariffs. Nor should we use new conditions to postpone
the decision a few months or a year. We should just leave MFN alone.
AMERICA'S GOALS
A broader debate over China policy, in Congress or the Presidential campaign, could
be a healthy thing. But it should begin by looking at what we hope to achieve through our
foreign policy generally, and where China policy fits into those goals.
The answers are, admittedly, not totally clear -- because we are still debating the
questions. Since the Cold War ended, we have considered collective security; promotion of
democracy and human rights; pursuit of economic advantage; and now with the Buchanan
campaign, safety through isolation.
The debate will no doubt continue for some time. But minimally, most of us would
agree that we should aim to promote peace and prosperity. And our relations with China will
inevitably play a large part in our ability to do that.
CHINA POLICY IN CONTEXT
China is the world's most populous country. It has nuclear weapons and the world's
largest army. It is a major industrial contributor to global climate change and pollution of the
oceans. And it is the world's fastest-growing major economy. So in the coming decades,
China will have significant effect, for good or for ill, on economic, environmental and
political developments in Asia and around the world.
If China is hostile -- or, short of outright hostility, refuses to recognize the standards
of behavior most countries accept, and approaches the world with an angry nationalism --
hopes for peace and prosperity recede.
And as the first half of this century showed, a weak, poor and fragmented China is
equally dangerous. It becomes a source of revolution. It sends refugees across the world.
And it attracts the greed and aggression of its neighbors, as it did Bolshevik Russia and
Imperial Japan.
So we should do what we can to avoid either extreme. That requires patient,
continuous engagement. We should work with China wherever possible. And issues like
environmental protection and security in Korea show that it is often possible. And when we
have disputes with China short of open and unprovoked breaches of the peace, we should
address them seriously but calmly, without threatening the total relationship.
AREAS OF DISPUTE
Since 1989, human rights has probably been the most heated of these disputes.
Humanitarian feeling, and the historical experiences which teach us that repressive
governments tend to be more belligerent abroad, show that we need a human rights policy.
But reviewing the slim results of the past seven years in this area, we should be willing to
consider new methods.
The Committee of 100, a group of eminent Chinese-Americans, recently commented
that:
"Past U.S. approaches toward advocating human rights in China have been ineffective.
It is time to consider a fresh approach... Encouraging China to follow the rule of law,
both domestically and internationally, and assisting China with the development of its
legal institutions will help lay the foundations for a broadening of political rights."
China's Justice Minister, Xiao Yang, made a similar suggestion to me in 1993. I
believe we should continue advocacy on behalf of individual victims of abuses -- the cases of
the dissident Wei Jingsheng, the official Bao Tong and the union organizer Zhou Guoqiang
are examples. But on larger issues, a less heated, longer-term policy concentrating on broader
rule of law questions may be a sound idea.
Some security issues also fall into this category. We need a strong policy, including
sanctions if necessary, to deal with weapons proliferation. We need continuous diplomacy,
coordinated with Europe, Japan and Russia, to halt nuclear tests. And we need to make sure,
as Secretary Perry did in March, that while the Chinese government understands that we
follow a one-China policy, it does not get the impression that it can fire missiles and threaten
conflict in the Taiwan Strait with impunity.
TRADE POLICY
We also need a serious approach to trade.
Last year we exported $14 billion in goods and services to China -- slightly above
Malaysia and a little bit below Belgium. We should expect much more from a country of 1.2
billion with the world's third largest economy and 10% annual growth. We should be
exporting twice or three times as much as we do.
And while last year's export growth was good, it was less than what we should expect.
To be exact, last year's exports to China and Hong Kong combined rose $5.3 billion. By
comparison, export growth to the ASEAN countries was $7.6 billion, and to Japan $14
billion.
Some of this reflects outdated U.S. policies. As the US-China Business Council noted
in its report "Balancing US-China Trade by Expanding US Exports to China," we hold
ourselves back by restricting Ex-Im Bank, Asian Environmental Partnership, and Trade
Development Agency support for American exporters, and banning sale of high-tech products
available easily from our competitors. If we use sanctions, they should hit foreign countries
and not our own firms and workers.
But these problems are very small compared to China's trade barriers. USTR's 1996
National Trade Estimate cites tariffs averaging 35%. Quotas. Import licenses. Restrictions
on trading rights. Unfair, unscientific agricultural standards. About $2 billion worth of
piracy in copyright works like films and CDs. Subsidies for state-owned export industries.
Forced technology transfer. And a habit of linking trade to politics, especially in high-profile
buys of airplanes, cars and so forth.
These policies hurt China as well as us. This year's MFN debate is a perfect example.
Wheat farmers are usually among the strongest supporters of MFN status. But at least in
Montana, they are losing interest fast, because of China's refusal to end the ban on wheat
from the Pacific Northwest.
Likewise, the Chinese often get credit around here for long-term thinking. But to
award airplane contracts and auto deals because of political relations is the opposite. It is
short-sighted and damaging to China, because it means fewer Americans have a stake in a
smooth relationship. The military strategist Sun Tzu says breaking up the enemy's alliances
is a crucial strategic task. What would he say about a general who breaks up his own
alliances abroad before they start?
So we have much work to do. We must use our trade laws to enforce agreements on
market access and intellectual property. We should move to sanctions soon if China continues
to drag its feet on our intellectual property agreement. And we should work hard on China's
WTO application. Our policy, as stated in the 1992 Market Access MOU, is that:
"The US government will staunchly support China's achievement of contracting party
status to the GATT and will work constructively with the Chinese government and
other GATT contracting parties to reach agreement on an acceptable "Protocol" and
then China's rapid attainment of contracting party status."
We should keep that promise. But it is not a one-way promise as China sometimes
maintains. Our support depends on an acceptable Protocol. And no acceptable Protocol can
allow copyright piracy, protectionist agricultural standards and other abusive practices. A
good deal may take time to achieve, but it is worth it.
RECOGNIZE MUTUAL INTERESTS
And while a firm approach to disputes is important, we must not let our attention
focus solely on the negative. It is no less important to take advantage of our areas of mutual
interest.
These include many security questions. Avoiding nuclear arms races in Korea, South
Asia and the Persian Gulf. Peace in the Taiwan Strait. Strengthening the peace in Indochina.
Maintaining the prosperity and the rule of law.in Hong Kong; and we should not be afraid to
tell them that things like weakening Hong Kong's Bill of Rights or abolishing the Legislative
Council would damage those mutual interests. Cooperation on threats to both countries like
drug trafficking and terrorism.
They include humanitarian issues. Preventing factory fires and mining disasters which
take thousands of lives every year. Promoting adoption of Chinese orphans.
And they include environmental protection. Helping China create modem standards of
water protection, reduce smug and control greenhouse gases means a better quality of life for
Chinese. It means a booming market for American environmental technology firms. And the
lessening of a vast potential threat to the world's oceans and atmosphere.
END THE MFN DEBATE
And whether we are talking about these mutual interests, or our disputes, there is
really only one way to succeed. That is by staying engaged and remembering our long-term
goal of a world a bit more peaceful and more prosperous.
Barring a cataclysmic event that makes engagement impossible -- an unprovoked
attack on Taiwan, for example -- revoking or conditioning MEN will not help achieve that
goal. Rather the reverse, to put it mildly. And if such an event were to occur, a policy based
on MFN would be far too weak. If we were to limit our response to economics -- and we
should not -- our better option is a straightforward embargo.
In fact, there is no situation to which revoking MFN status would be the appropriate
response. And thus, after six years, it is time to end the debate. It has become simply an
artificial, annual crisis at a time when we have all too many real ones.
So this year, the Administration should show strength and confidence in its basically
sound policy. I believe it can fight and win the votes in the House and the Senate. And once
that is done we should move on. Next year, we should bring China out of the Jackson-Vanik
Amendment and close the MFN debate for good.
Let me stop there, and now I'll take your questions.
